

September 12, 2019

Florida House of Representatives  
513 The Capitol  
402 South Monroe Street  
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1300  
Phone: (850) 717-5650

**PART X: INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLIC ORDER**  
**CHAPTER 73: INVESTIGATIONS BY LEGISLATIVE BODIES**  
**Sec. 795: Right of a Legislative Body to Make Investigations**

In the Matter of: **Florida SC: 19-408**

**CHRISTOPHER E. HALLETT VS FL. DEPT. OF REVENUE**


Dear Mr. Speaker

As things seem to be on a “Regressive” trend as opposed to making Progress in this Sharia Law issue; I am offering to testify before the Committee/s to answer any questions related to my work into “*The Emoluments Clause*” (*Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8*), and the missing “*Thirteenth Amendment*” to the Constitution of The United States of America related to the Federal Court Cases submitted by my Office.

More specifically to continue where AG, William Barr, left off with his answer to my *Parliamentary Inquiry* differentiating “*Stipends*” and “*Subsidies*” with respect to Government Contractor verses Employees acting in an Official Capacity, and why the “*Fiduciary Duty*” is critical when representing clients.

**Short version:** Government oversight into the Familial Relationship of any kind constitutes a Trespass of Law, & Government Overreach. This needs to be expunged, and compensated appropriately after 10 years of fighting this nonsensical argument.

Respectfully Submitted



Christopher E. Hallett (CEO)

ε~Clause® (Loss Prevention LLC. L17000211617)

(Ohio Fiduciary No. 443079 / Florida Notary No. GG154748)

*Sacramentum habet in se tres comites, veritatem justitiam et judicium; veritas habenda est in jurato; justitia et judicium in judice,*

An oath has in it three components – truth, justice, and judgment: truth in the party swearing, justice and judgment in the judge (administering the oath).

**PART I**  
**PARLIAMENTARY LAW AND RULES**  
**CHAPTER 1**  
**RULES GOVERNING PROCEDURE\***

**Sec. 1. Necessity for Rules of Procedure**

1. It is necessary that every deliberative body be governed by rules of procedure in order that the will of a majority of its members may be determined and revealed in an orderly manner.

---

*\*Note Concerning Citations:* A brief statement by Jefferson in the introduction to his manual describes the use of citations in this volume so accurately that it is repeated here as better describing the use of the citations in this book than could be stated by the author.

"I could not doubt the necessity of quoting the sources of my information ... sometimes each authority cited supports the whole passage. Sometimes it rests on all taken together. Sometimes the authority goes only to a part of the text, the residue being inferred from known rules and principles. For some of the more familiar forms no written authority is or can be cited, no writer having presumed it necessary to repeat what all are presumed to know. The statement of these must rest on their own notoriety."

As far as feasible the text has been organized to facilitate the citation of authority. In order to leave the text unbroken the citations are carried as footnotes with reference to sections and paragraphs.

*Sec. 1, Par. 1:* Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Sec. 498; French v. California Senate (Calif., 1905); People *ex rel.* Gregory v. Strohm (Ill., 1918); *In re* Gunn (Kan., 1893); Nevins v. City Council of City of Springfield (Mass., 1917); Witherspoon v. Mississippi *ex rel.* West (Miss., 1925).

2. Any legislative body must have rules to promote the orderly and businesslike consideration of the questions that come before it for determination. These rules determine the priority and manner of consideration of questions and provide an orderly and methodical plan so that all business may receive proper consideration. Thus, confusion and waste of time and effort are eliminated.

3. Rules of procedure fulfill another purpose in protecting the rights of members. Individual members, for example, are entitled to receive notices of meetings and the opportunity to attend and participate in the deliberations of the group. Minorities often require protection from unfair treatment on the part of the majority, and even the majority is entitled to protection from obstructive tactics on the part of minorities.

4. Many rules of procedure are based upon fundamental rights such as the decision by the majority, but some rules are necessary only to avoid confusion by designating one course of procedure when more than one course might otherwise be followed. In some instances, as pointed out by Jefferson quoting earlier authority, it may be as important that there be a rule as what the rule is.

5. The great purpose of all rules and forms, says Cushing, is to subserve the will of the assembly rather than to restrain it; to facilitate and not to obstruct the expression of its deliberate sense.

*Sec. 1, Par. 4:* Jefferson, Sec. I.

*Sec. 1, Par. 5:* Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, p. 990; Dye v. Mississippi (Miss., 1987).

## Sec. 2. Right to Regulate Procedure

1. Every governmental body has an inherent right to regulate its own procedure, subject to provisions of the constitution or other controlling authority.

2. A house of a state legislature has complete authority concerning its procedure, so far as it is not limited by constitutional provisions.

3. The constitutional right of a state legislature to control its own procedure cannot be withdrawn or restricted by statute, but statutes may control procedure insofar as they do not conflict with the rules of the houses or with the rules contained in the constitution.

4. State legislatures and other bodies created by constitutional provision are controlled in their procedure by any provision of the constitution that directly, or by necessary implication, governs their procedure. Constitutions authorize the bodies whose procedure they regulate to establish their own rules of procedure.

*Sec. 2, Par. 1:* Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Sec. 792; Witherspoon v. Mississippi *ex rel.* West (Miss., 1925); Nebraska *ex rel.* Bishop v. Dunn (Neb., 1906); Jory v. Martin (Ore., 1936).

*Sec. 2, Par. 2:* Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Sec. 792; Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority v. City of Birmingham (Ala., 2005); Brinkhaus v. Senate of State of Louisiana (La., 1995).

*Sec. 2, Par. 3:* Goodwin v. State Bd. of Admin. (Ala., 1925).

*Sec. 2, Par. 4:* Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Sec. 793; Atkins v. Philips (Fla., 1890); Wheeler v. Kentucky (Ky., 1895); Witherspoon v. Mississippi *ex rel.* West (Miss., 1925).

5. In general, state legislatures are governed in accordance with the recognized principles of parliamentary law subject to any special provisions of the state constitutions and any rules adopted by the body.
6. The powers and privileges that are necessary to the proper exercise, in all respects, of its appropriate functions, are inherent in the legislature and are to be ascertained primarily by reference to the common parliamentary law.
7. An act of the legislature is legal when the constitution contains no prohibitions against it.

### Sec. 3. Each House Determines the Rules of Its Own Proceedings

*See also Sec. 6, Legislative Procedure Is Controlled by Constitutional Provisions; and Sec. 11, Joint Rules.*

1. State constitutions grant authority over procedure to each house of the legislature by substantially the following language: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

*Sec. 2, Par. 5:* Hodges v. Keel (Ark., 1913); Attorney General *ex rel.* Werts v. Rogers (N.J., 1894).

*Sec. 2, Par. 6:* Washington *ex rel.* Robinson v. Fluent (Wash., 1948).

*Sec. 2, Par. 7:* Diefendorf v. Gallet (Idaho, 1932).

*Sec. 3, Par. 1:* Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Sec. 792; U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 5, Par. 1; State Constitutions: Ala. IV, 53; Alaska II, 12; Ariz. IV, II, 8; Ark. V, 12; Calif. IV, 7(a); Colo. V, 12; Conn. III, 13; Del. II, 9; Fla. III, 4; Ga. III, Sec. IV, 4; Hawaii III, 12; Idaho III, 9; Ill. IV, 6; Ind. IV, 10; Iowa III, 9; Kan. II, 8; Ky. 39; La. III, 7(a); Maine IV, Part III, 4; Md. III, 19; Mass. Part II, Ch. 1, Sec. II, 7, Sec. III, 10; Mich. IV, 16; Minn. IV, 7; Miss. IV, 55; Mo. III, 18; Mont. V, 10; Neb. III, 10; Nev. IV, 6; N.H. II, 22, 37; N.J. IV, Sec. IV, Par. 3; N.M. IV, 11; N.Y.

2. The house and senate each may pass an internal operating rule for its own procedure that is in conflict with a statute formerly adopted.
3. A state constitution is a limitation rather than a grant of legislative power. If not withheld expressly or by implication, the whole legislative power of the state is committed to the legislature, which may enact any law not forbidden by the constitution or delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the states.
4. The provision of the constitution that each house shall have the power to determine the rules of its proceedings is not restricted to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters, but extends to determination of propriety and effect of any action taken by the body in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business or performance of any duty conferred upon it by the constitution, as in proposing amendments to the constitution.

III, 9; N.D. IV, 12; Ohio II, 7; Okla. V, 30; Ore. IV, 11; Pa. II, 11; R.I. VI, 7; S.C. III, 12; S.D. III, 9; Tenn. II, 12; Texas III, 11; Utah VI, 12; Vt. II, 19; Va. IV, 7; Wash. II, 9; W.Va. VI, 24; Wis. IV, 8; Wyo. III, 12.

*Sec. 3, Par. 2:* Moffitt v. Willis (Fla., 1984); Coggin v. Davey (Ga., 1975); Bd. of Trustees of Judicial Form Retirement System v. Attorney General of Com. (Ky., 2003); Baines v. New Hampshire Senate President (N.H., 2005); Hughes v. Speaker of the New Hampshire House of Representatives (N.H., 2005).

*Sec. 3, Par. 3:* Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Secs. 715-719; Jory v. Martin (Ore., 1936).

*Sec. 3, Par. 4:* Opinion of the Justices (Ala., 1949); Watson, et al. v. California Fair Political Practices Comm'n (Calif., 1990); Des Moines Register v. Dwyer (Iowa, 1996); Union Leader Corp. v. Chandler (N.H., 1979); North Dakota *ex rel.* Spaeth v. Meiers (N.D., 1987).

5. The constitutional rule that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings is authorization for the enactment of joint rules.
6. Under the power to determine the rules of its own procedure, each house of the legislature has the power to determine how it will handle conference committee reports, including a minority report.
7. The fact that a house of the legislature acted in violation of its own rules or in violation of parliamentary law in a matter clearly within its power does not make its action subject to review by the courts.

#### Sec. 4. Sources of Rules of Procedure

*See also Sec. 11, Joint Rules; Ch. 6, Secs. 35-39, Parliamentary Law; and Sec. 43, Indispensable Requirements for Making Valid Group Decisions.*

1. Rules of procedure passed by one legislature or statutory provisions governing the legislative process are not binding on a subsequent legislature.

*Sec. 3, Par. 5: Charleston National Bank v. Fox (W.Va., 1937).*

*Sec. 3, Par. 6: Opinion of the Justices (Ala., 1975).*

*Sec. 3, Par. 7: Connecticut v. Sav. Bank of New London (Conn., 1906).*

*Sec. 4, Par. 1: Manigault v. Springs (U.S., 1905); U. S. v. Smith (U.S., 1932); Baker v. Carr (U.S., 1962); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n. (D.C. Cir., 1975); Sierra Club v. Froehlke (5<sup>th</sup> Cir., Texas, 1987); Peterson v. U.S. Dept. of Interior (9<sup>th</sup> Cir., Calif., 1990); Malone v. Meekins (Alaska, 1982); Abood v. League of Women Voters of Alaska (Alaska, 1987); Watson, et al. v. California Fair Political Practices Comm'n (Calif., 1990); Moffitt v. Willis (Fla., 1984); Coggin v. Davey (Ga., 1975); Des Moines Register v. Dwyer (Iowa, 1996); Opinion of the Justices (Maine, 1951); MSHA v. Depositors Trust Co. (Maine, 1971); Edgerly v. Honeywell (Maine, 1977); Wisconsin *ex rel.* La Follette v. Sritt (Wis., 1983).*

2. Rules of legislative procedure are derived from several sources and take precedence in the order listed below. The principal sources are as follows:

- (a) Constitutional provisions and judicial decisions thereon.
- (b) Adopted rules.
- (c) Custom, usage and precedents.
- (d) Statutory provisions.
- (e) Adopted parliamentary authority.
- (f) Parliamentary law.

*See also Sec. 560, Each House of a Legislature Is the Judge of the Election and Qualifications of Its Members, particularly Par. 2.*

3. Judicial decisions, to the extent they are interpretations of rules from one of the sources, take the same precedence as the source interpreted. Thus, for example, an interpretation of a constitutional provision takes precedence over a statute.

4. Whenever there is conflict between rules from these sources, the rule from the source listed earlier prevails over the rule from the source listed later. For example, where the constitution requires three readings of bills, this provision controls over any provision of adopted rules, statutes, adopted manual or parliamentary law.

5. The term "parliamentary law" is sometimes used in two different senses. It applies to rules having two different priorities. Certain indispensable basic

*Sec. 4, Par. 2: Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Sec. 614; Des Moines Register v. Dwyer (Iowa, 1996).*

*Sec. 4, Par. 4: Starr v. Governor (N.H., 2006).*

principles, such as the requirement of a meeting, a quorum or a majority vote, apply to all groups, in all instances and without adoption, superseding adopted rules and statutes, while other rules, sometimes also called parliamentary law, are mere custom and give way to adopted rules and apply only when the assembly has not adopted any contrary rule or practice. It is often necessary to determine in which sense the term is used.

6. There is a reason for every form of parliamentary procedure that has been long sanctioned by general usage. These procedures have been approved by experience, have been found useful and expedient in practice, and have grown into general acceptance.

*Sec. 4, Par. 5: Waples, Sec. 201.*

## CHAPTER 2

### CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING PROCEDURE

*See also Sec. 281, Right of Legislative Bodies to Suspend Rules.*

#### Sec. 6. Legislative Procedure Is Controlled by Constitutional Provisions

*See also Sec. 3, Each House Determines the Rules of Its Own Proceedings.*

1. Provisions in the constitutions of the states usually provide, among other things, that each house of the legislature shall determine the rules of its proceedings; that each house shall judge the qualifications, election and returns of members; that each house may choose its officers; that a majority of the house shall constitute a quorum; that each house may discipline or expel members; and that each house shall keep a journal.

2. A constitutional provision regulating procedure controls over all other rules of procedure.

#### Sec. 7. Constitutional Requirements Concerning Procedure Must Be Complied With

*See also Ch. 64, Secs. 694-703, Journals and Records.*

1. Being organic in character, constitutional provisions stand on a higher plane than statutes and are mandatory. Constitutional provisions prescribing exact or exclusive time or methods for certain acts are mandatory and must be complied with. Constitutional provisions that are general in nature and not exclusive may be directory. Examples of directory provisions are given below.

- (a) Where there is no constitutional provision requiring that a legislature read a bill on three separate days, a law to that effect is directory only, and an act passed without complying with the statute is not invalidated thereby.
- (b) A provision for recording the yeas and nays on the passage of a bill may be directory only and not mandatory.
2. If Congress or a state legislature violates a constitutional requirement, the courts will declare its enactment void.
3. Under a state constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, legislation not prohibited may be allowed. State constitutional provisions are not grants of power, but, instead, are limitations on otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its legislature. A legislature may enact any laws that state or federal constitutions do not prohibit.

*Sec. 7, Par. 1: Capito v. Topping (W.Va., 1909).*

*Sec. 7, Par. 1(a): Schweizer v. Territory (Okla., 1897); Capito v. Topping (W.Va., 1909).*

*Sec. 7, Par. 1(b): People ex rel. Scott v. Supervisors of Chenango (N.Y., 1853).*

*Sec. 7, Par. 2: Missouri ex rel. Fox v. Alt (Mo., 1887).*

*Sec. 7, Par. 3: New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n v. Civil Service Com'n of City of New Orleans (La., 1982); Aquillard v. Treen (La., 1983); Banner County, Nebraska v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment (Neb., 1987).*

## CHAPTER 3

### ADOPTED RULES GOVERNING PROCEDURE

*See also Ch. 28, Secs. 279-286, Suspension of the Rules.*

#### Sec. 10. Right to Adopt Rules

1. A legislative body has the right to adopt rules of procedure.
2. It is customary for every legislative body to adopt rules that provide for its organization, for its officers and committees, and for special rules of procedure. In practice, most of the rules relating to procedure are based upon general parliamentary law, but they also may contain rules of procedure applicable to the body that deviate from parliamentary usage.
3. The power of each house of a state legislature to make its own rules is subordinate to the rules contained in the constitution.
4. Either house of Congress or either house of a state legislature may make special rules for itself. Any other assembly may make regulations for its own government, and they may be partly or wholly different from those of the established parliamentary procedure.

*Sec. 10, Par. 1: French v. California Senate (Calif., 1905); Witherspoon v. Mississippi ex rel. West (Miss., 1925).*

*Sec. 10, Par. 2: Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Secs. 306-313; Hughes, Sec. 5; Tayloe v. Davis (Ala., 1924); Dye v. Mississippi (Miss., 1987); Heimbach v. New York (N.Y., 1982).*

*Sec. 10, Par. 3: Tayloe v. Davis (Ala., 1924).*

*Sec. 10, Par. 4: Waples, Sec. 209; Heimbach v. New York (N.Y., 1982).*

5. Adopted rules of procedure need not be founded on custom, nor is it essential to their validity that they be reasonable, but they must not infringe upon private rights.

6. Adopted rules bear the same relation to the common law rules of order that statutes bear to the common law. They are of no effect when they are a mere repetition of common law rules. However, when they conflict with the latter, they supersede and override rules founded merely upon usage when they cover the same ground but provide different procedures.

7. Almost all of the rules of procedure that are adopted by deliberative bodies are rules of the common parliamentary law and need no adoption of which the courts will take notice to make them effective, whether written out and formally adopted or not.

### Sec. 11. Joint Rules

*See also Sec. 3, Each House Determines the Rules of Its Own Proceedings; and Sec. 4, Sources of Rules of Procedure.*

1. With few exceptions, state legislatures adopt joint rules that govern relations between the houses and other matters in which the houses have joint interests. The adoption of joint rules by a legislature is not incompatible with the constitutional provision providing that each house shall determine the rules of its procedure, nor does this rule preclude either house from adopting the same rules as the other.

*Sec. 10, Par. 5:* Waples, Sec. 209; Heimbach v. New York (N.Y., 1982).

*Sec. 10, Par. 6:* Waples, Sec. 209.

*Sec. 10, Par. 7:* Waples, Sec. 205 (5).

*Sec. 11, Par. 1:* Tayloe v. Davis (Ala., 1924).

2. Joint rules adopted by a state legislature expire with the convening of a subsequent legislature.

### Sec. 12. Rules Must Conform to Constitutional Provisions

1. A legislative body cannot make a rule that evades or avoids the effect of a rule prescribed by the constitution governing it, and it cannot do by indirection what it cannot do directly.

2. A third party cannot object to a breach of parliamentary rules. The members of the body alone have that right.

3. Rules adopted by a state legislative body expire with the convening of a subsequent legislature.

### Sec. 13. Right to Change Rules

*See also Sec. 14, Rules Can Be Suspended; Sec. 15, Failure of a House of the Legislature to Conform to Its Rules Does Not Invalidate Its Acts; and Ch. 28, Secs. 279-286, Suspension of the Rules.*

1. Legislative bodies have power to abolish, modify or waive their own rules of procedure.

2. A majority does not have power to make a rule that cannot be modified or repealed by a majority. If a majority of an official public body has authority in the

*Sec. 12, Par. 1:* Tayloe v. Davis (Ala., 1924); Crawford v. Gilchrist (Fla., 1912); Brennan v. Connolly (Mich., 1919).

*Sec. 12, Par. 2:* Corre v. Ohio (Ohio, 1883).

*Sec. 12, Par. 3:* Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, Sec. 792.

*Sec. 13, Par. 1:* Holt v. City Council of Somerville (Mass., 1879); Chandler v. Lawrence (Mass., 1880); Rutherford v. City of Nashville (Tenn., 1935).



first instance to pass a rule, it has authority to annul or repeal the same rule. Rules that can be adopted by a majority vote can be repealed or annulled by the same vote, even a rule that provides that no rule can be repealed or amended without a vote greater than a majority.

3. The power of a house of a legislature to determine its rules of proceedings is a continuous power. It can always be exercised by the house and is absolute and beyond the challenge of any body or tribunal if the rule does not ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.

4. A legislative house cannot tie its own hands by establishing unchangeable rules. It may adopt and change procedure at any time and with no other notice than the rules may require.

5. Rules of procedure passed by one legislature or statutory provisions governing the legislative process are not binding on a subsequent legislature.

6. No meeting of a legislative body can bind a subsequent one by irrevocable acts or rules of procedure. The power to enact is the power to repeal. A rule requiring a two-thirds vote to alter or amend the acts of the body

---

*Sec. 13, Par. 2: Missouri ex rel. Kiel v. Reichmann (Mo., 1911); Richardson v. Union Congregational Soc'y of Francetown (N.H., 1877).*

*Sec. 13, Par. 3: North Dakota ex rel. Spaeth v. Meiers (N.D., 1987); Davis v. Thompson (Okla., 1986); South Carolina ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis (S.C., 1936).*

*Sec. 13, Par. 4: French v. California Senate (Calif., 1905).*

*Sec. 13, Par. 6: Richardson v. Union Congregational Soc'y of Francetown (N.H., 1877); Commonwealth v. Mayor of Lancaster (Pa., 1836).*

may itself be altered, amended or repealed by the same power that enacted it.

7. Rules of procedure are always within control of the majority of a deliberative body and may be changed at any time by a majority vote.

### Sec. 14. Rules Can Be Suspended

*See also Sec. 13, Right to Change Rules; Sec. 32, Effect of Adoption of Parliamentary Authority, particularly Par. 3; Ch. 28, Secs. 279-286, Suspension of the Rules; and Sec. 407, Amendment of Rules.*

1. The rules of the individual houses of the legislature are under their own control and may be suspended whenever, in the judgment of that body, suspension is required. This does not apply to rules of procedure imposed by the constitution.

2. During the same sitting, a legislative body may treat proceedings already taken as irregular or may reconsider the action, unless some right of a third person intervenes.

3. The purpose of rules is to aid a body to perform its duties more efficiently and with fairness to its members. Whenever the rules fail to serve this purpose and are not required by the constitution or other controlling authority, the rules may be suspended. Rules often require more than a majority vote for their suspension.

---

*Sec. 13, Par. 7: Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Chace (Pa., 1961).*

*Sec. 14, Par. 1: South Carolina v. Brown (S.C., 1890).*

*Sec. 14, Par. 2: Mansfield v. O'Brien (Mass., 1930).*

4. The rules under which a deliberative body will operate may be changed, suspended or waived at the body's pleasure where the rules of procedure are within control of the majority.

### Sec. 15. Failure of a House of the Legislature to Conform to Its Rules Does Not Invalidate Its Acts

*See also Sec. 13, Right to Change Rules; Sec. 32, Effect of Adoption of Parliamentary Authority, particularly Par. 3; Sec. 73, Powers of Courts over Legislative Bodies Generally, particularly Par. 3; Sec. 281, Right of Legislative Bodies to Suspend Rules; Sec. 284, Suspension of Rules by Implication; and Sec. 407, Amendment of Rules.*

1. Violation of rules of procedure adopted by a house of the legislature for its own convenience and not required by the constitution will not impair the validity of a statute.
2. A legislative body having the right to do an act must be allowed to select the means of accomplishing such act within reasonable bounds.
3. A rule is virtually repealed for the occasion when it is disregarded by those who have power to control it; and the act of breaking it is at least a suspension of it. The body at its preceding meetings does not have the power

*Sec. 14, Par. 4: Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Chace (Pa., 1961).*

*Sec. 15, Par. 1: Tayloe v. Davis (Ala., 1924); Goodwin v. State Bd. of Admin. (Ala., 1925); Missouri ex rel. Fox v. Alt (Mo., 1887); Ohio ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (Ohio, 1999); Bryan v. Liburd (Virgin Is., 1996).*

*Sec. 15, Par. 2: Attorney General v. Brissenden (Mass., 1930).*

to bind its successors or to put shackles on it that might be cast off only in a particular way.

4. Under a constitutional provision declaring that each house of the legislature shall determine the rules of its own proceedings, the fact that a house acted in violation of its own rules or in violation of parliamentary law in a matter clearly within its power does not make its action subject to review by the courts.

### Sec. 16. Fraud Will Invalidate Acts

*See also Sec. 43, Indispensable Requirements for Making Valid Group Decisions, particularly Par. 9.*

Where there is more than a mere technical violation of the rules of procedure, the violation may invalidate the act, and an act will be invalidated where there is fraud or bad faith.

*Sec. 15, Par. 3: Commonwealth v. Mayor of Lancaster (Pa., 1836).*

*Sec. 15, Par. 4: Connecticut v. Sav. Bank of New London (Conn., 1906); Ohio ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (Ohio, 1999); Bryan v. Liburd (Virgin Is., 1996).*

*Sec. 16: South Georgia Power Co. v. Baumann (Ga., 1929); People v. Albany and Susquehanna R.R. Co. (N.Y., 1869).*

**CHAPTER 4**  
**STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING**  
**PROCEDURE**

**Sec. 20. Statutory Provisions**

*See also Sec. 281, Right of Legislative Bodies to Suspend Rules.*

1. Rules of procedure may be addressed by statutes.
  
2. If two statutes are in conflict, the statute that is more specifically directed to the matter at issue prevails as an exception to the statute that is more general in character.

---

*Sec. 20, Par. 1: Zemprelli v. Scranton (Pa., 1986).*

*Sec. 20, Par. 2: Bethard v. State, Through Bd. of Tr's (La., 1983).*

# In the 116<sup>th</sup> Congress for the United States of America

PART X: INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLIC ORDER  
 CHAPTER 73: INVESTIGATIONS BY LEGISLATIVE BODIES  
 Sec. 795: Right of a Legislative Body to Make Investigations

*Maladicta expositio quae corrumpit textum, It is a cursed construction that corrupts the text*  
*Corpus humanum non recipit aestimationem. The person of a human being can have no price put on it*

A	B	C	D	E	
CONSTITUTION Article 4 Section 4 Political Argument		Negative Nexus <i>Corruptio optimi pessima</i> [(-1 X -1) = 1] Kangaroo Court		"A Stipend attached to some Office" (Bill Barr's answer to my Par. Inq.)	
G	G	I	G	G	P
ADVANTAGES					PROFIT
Fake Jurisdiction is the baseline being forced (SMU)					M Fees
I	O	I	I	S	S
N	E	N	N	C	N
S	S	E	S	C	S
Bond		Bond		Bond	
I	C		T		
C	E	Cestui que trust Bonds			S
ALTOURNES					ATTORNEY
STATUTES CODES RULES REGULATIONS PROTOCOLS (Pleadings & Word Salad)					TITLE 4 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT EMOLUMENTS SCAM SPECIAL PROJECT JUDGES DIVORCE
ENTITLEMENTS EQUALS EMOLUMENTS					E~ Clause. SIGNED: THE FORE FATHERS (SMU) = Shit Made Up
<i>Praetextu liciti non debet admitti illicitum</i> What is illegal ought not be entered under the pretext of legality					

## Article 4, section 4,

**Republican Government:** *The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.*

## Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8,

*No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State.*

## Amendment 13 to the Constitution of the United States

*"If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain, any title of nobility or honor, or shall without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office, or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them."*